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This chapter summarizes the latest (post-2012) eminent domain law in Taiwan. It 
focuses on the six pillars of takings law, namely public interest criteria, subjects of the 
eminent domain power, just compensation, due process, distribution of development 
surpluses, and the dispute resolution system. The 2012 reform brings along takings 
laws in books that are stricter than ever in terms of public interest and necessity 
analysis, but administrative courts typically defer to the administrative agencies’ 
judgments. Only government agencies and certain public legal persons can apply to 
the state to condemn. Just compensation now means payment of current market value, 
but the differences between how much condemnees receive pre- and post- 2012 
remain unclear. Procedural requirements regarding expropriation constitute an 
intricate web of rules. Nonetheless, in the process of negotiated purchase, local 
governments are often criticized for not bargaining in good faith. Thus, the due 
process requirement does not guarantee substantive equity or efficiency. Development 
surpluses go entirely to the state. The dispute resolution system consists of two or 
three levels of re-examination within the administrative branch before the 
condemnees can bring their cases to the administrative court. This chapter concludes 
with a policy recommendation that uses hedonic regression models to estimate land 
value for offers in the negotiated purchase stage and for the land value in the takings 
compensation stage. 
Keywords 
Takings compensation, due process, hedonic regression model, public interest, just 
compensation, dispute resolution, development surplus, appraisal, judicial review  
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The Constitution of Taiwan fails to include a “just compensation” clause or a 
“public use” clause. Article 143, Section 1 of the Constitution of Taiwan does 
prescribe that “[a]ll land within the territory of the Republic of China shall belong to 
the whole body of citizens. Private ownership of land, acquired by the people in 
accordance with law, shall be protected and restricted by law. Privately-owned land 
shall be liable to taxation according to its value, and the Government may buy such 
land according to its value.” As the final clause (buy…land) is interpreted as different 
from expropriation, the constitution provides little guidance in determining the scope 
and limit of eminent domain. However, the Constitutional Court is not entirely absent 
from this scene. In fact, in a number of constitutional interpretations,1 the 
Constitutional Court constructed the constitutional mandate regarding the 
governmental use of the eminent domain power. Not all of the interpretations are 
equally influential. It should be fair to say that those on due process have shaped the 
evolution of takings law by prompting the revision of the relevant statutes formerly 
declared unconstitutional. By contrast, the interpretations regarding just compensation 
and public interest are more expressive than substantive, as the Constitutional Court 
has yet to advance concrete tests that the government or the administrative courts can 
                                                 
1 Interpretation Nos. 110, 215, 236, 336, 400, 409, 425, 440, 508, 513, 516, 534, 579, and 652. 
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apply in future cases.  
As a result, eminent domain law in Taiwan is mainly statutory and regulatory. 
The legislature and the administration have a wide discretion in shaping the takings 
law. In introducing the “Six Pillars” of the taking laws in Taiwan, this chapter draws 
heavily on statutes and administrative regulations, while also keeping an eye on 
decisions made by the administrative courts. Since the year 2000, the Land 
Expropriation Act (hereinafter “LEA”) has been the major source of law for takings of 
land and fixtures. Before then, expropriation stipulations were scattered in many 
different statutes. Now, pursuant to Article 1, Paragraphs 1–2 of the LEA, “Land 
expropriation shall be governed by this Act. Matters not provided in this Act shall be 
governed by other applicable laws. Where other laws are inconsistent with this Act 
with regard to expropriation procedures and expropriation compensation standards, 
this Act shall prevail.”2 Hence, this chapter frequently turns to the LEA and the 
regulations stipulated to complement the LEA. 
 In the LEA,3 there are three types of expropriation: land expropriation, zone 
                                                 
2 In this chapter, I will rely on the official translations of the Constitution, statutes, and regulations, 
available at the official website of the Ministry of Justice, Taiwan, http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/.  
3 The Land Act also considers a “moratorium to develop” as one type of takings. Land subject to the 
moratorium will usually be condemned at a later date. 
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expropriation, and incidental expropriation. This chapter focuses on land 
expropriation, which is used in a broad swath of undertakings to condemn one or 
multiple land parcels. Zone expropriation is the condemnation of all land parcels in 
one specific area. The fundamentals of zone expropriations and land expropriation are 
the same, but zone expropriation can only be used in more limited circumstances 
(such as urban revitalization) and is subject to stricter procedural requirements. Due to 
limited space, zone expropriation will be covered only in Part VI, where the unique 
compensation options are summarized. Incidental expropriation refers to the 
condemnation of fixtures on the land. Its procedure is combined with that of land 
expropriation and zone expropriation. As such, incidental expropriation will be 
covered in the discussions of the six pillars below. Official statistics regarding the 
practice of land expropriation and zone expropriation in Taiwan from 2001 to 2013 
are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. 
This chapter is divided into seven parts, the first six of which introduce the six 
pillars of eminent domain: public interest criteria, subjects of the eminent domain 
power, just compensation, due process, distribution of development surpluses, and the 
dispute resolution system. Before concluding, Part VII provides the author’s own 
reform proposal of eminent domain law in Taiwan. 
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II. PUBLIC INTEREST CRITERIA 
Public interest and necessity are the two key criteria to meet before the state 
exercises its eminent domain power. Article 15 of the Taiwan Constitution protects 
private property rights, and Article 23 and a long list of constitutional interpretations 
have established that private property rights and other human rights can be limited, if 
commensurate with the “proportionality principle.”4 Article 3 of the LEA further 
spells out that takings must be “for public interest purposes” and “to the extent strictly 
required.” These two criteria are abstract. Unfortunately, neither the Constitutional 
Court nor the Supreme Administrative Court has developed clearer tests to implement 
these two statutory requirements. Administrative courts, in particular, have been 
extremely deferential to the government in these two matters, essentially giving the 
latter a blank check (Chang 2010).  
Takings of real properties are further limited to certain undertakings. Article 3 of 
the LEA first lists nine concrete undertakings: National defense; communication or 
transportation; public utility enterprises; water conservancy; public health and 
environmental protection; government office buildings, office buildings of local self-
governing bodies and other public buildings; educational, academic and cultural 
                                                 
4 For application of the proportionality principle in Taiwan and other East Asian countries, see Huang 
and Law (2015) 
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undertakings; social welfare; and state-owned enterprises. Then Article 3 of the LEA 
is willing to accommodate “other undertakings for which land may be expropriated 
according to law.” The devil is in the details. The Ministry of the Interior, the central 
competent agency in charge of the LEA, has identified 29 other statutes that authorize 
expropriation of real estates. In short, the state can also condemn properties for the 
following undertakings: building subways, railroads, highways, city roads, science 
parks, export zones, national parks, public housing, public cemetery, airports, fishery 
ports and international business ports, wild animal protection zones, water aqueducts, 
and high schools and elementary schools; preserving landmarks; consolidating oddly-
shaped land; urban renewal; flood prevention; establishing produce markets; among 
others (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a: 7–10). Due to the open-ended nature of the 
list, the legislature can at any time expand the scope of takings without amending the 
high-profile LEA. 
The hands-off attitude of the court led to several controversial, large-scale 
takings around 2011. Mass protests, scholarly critiques, and the presidential election 
in March 2012 led to a major revision of the LEA in December 2011. The newly 
enacted Article 3-1 of the LEA, for the first time in decades, tied the hands of the state 
from wielding eminent domain power. More specifically, a “land use applicant” (more 
on this in Part III) should “whenever possible, avoid choosing farmland and give 
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priority consideration to public land or land owned by state-owned enterprises without 
existing land use plan.” In response to the controversy of condemning premium 
farmland to build science parks, Article 3-1 stipulates that for agricultural land, “the 
competent authority in charge of the relevant industry should give consideration to the 
public interest purpose and necessity of expropriation at the time of designation or 
rezoning….If the agricultural land located within the land selected by a land use 
applicant is exempted from the approval of the regional plan preparing authority with 
regard to its rezoning, the approval of the agriculture authority under the municipal or 
county (city) government shall first be obtained before the land is changed to non-
agricultural use.” Premium agricultural land, according to the last paragraph of Article 
3-1, in principle cannot be condemned, unless odd pieces of such land are interspersed 
and it is difficult to circumvent condemning it.5 
Moreover, the also newly enacted Article 3-2 of the LEA requires a 
comprehensive assessment of the public interest and necessity of the takings project. 
The legislature even lays out the variables to be considered:  
                                                 
5 Article 3-1 of the LEA also details that the exceptions to this no-taking principle are takings for 
“national defense, communication or transportation, or water conservancy undertaking; a public utility 
enterprise for erecting power transmission lines; or for use in an infrastructure project already approved 
by the Executive Yuan.” 
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“1. Social factors: Including the size of population affected by the 
expropriation, the age structure of the affected population, and the extent 
of effects of the expropriation plan on the current status of the 
surrounding communities, the life style of and health risk to 
disadvantaged groups.  
2. Economic factors: Including the effects of the expropriation plan 
on tax revenue, food security, increase/decrease in jobs or population that 
might be forced to change jobs, the costs of expropriation, public 
facilities required of governments at all levels, the fiscal expenditure and 
burden of governments, the agriculture, forestry, fishery, or animal 
husbandry industry chain and the integrity of land use. 
3. Cultural and ecological factors: Including changes in natural 
urban/rural sceneries, cultural relics, living conditions or life style caused 
by the expropriation plan, and its impacts on the ecological environment 
of the area, surrounding residents or the society as a whole. 
4. Sustainable development factors: Including national sustainable 
development policies, sustainability indicators, and national land use 
planning. 
5. Others: Other relevant factors or factors that should be evaluated 
Yun-chien Chang   
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based on the individual expropriation plan.” 
 
The Ministry of the Interior reviews the assessment of public interest and 
necessity. Articles 2, 14, and 15 of the LEA prescribe that the Ministry of the Interior 
establish a “Takings Review Task Force.”6 Articles 13 and 13-1 authorize the 
Ministry of the Interior, through the Takings Review Task Force, to review the 
assessment of public interest and necessity, among others. The Ministry of the 
Interior, in two administrative rules announced in 2011 and 2012 (the Ministry of the 
Interior 2013a:1044), requires an additional review of public interest and necessity for 
certain takings projects in an earlier stage of the whole process (see Part V and Figure 
1). More specifically, these takings projects (1) are implemented as zone 
expropriation (see also Article 4 of Regulations on Implementing Zone 
Expropriation); (2) involve certain undertakings (for example, building or establishing 
export zones, science parks, produce markets, airports); (3) expand urban planning; or 
(4) develop more than 30 hectares. The two-time reviews have to be substantive and 
de novo each time (Chen 2013: 283–84).  
Administrative courts since 2012 also have to review the public interest and 
                                                 
6 The Task Force consists of 17 members. Eight members are officials from several relevant 
government agencies. Nine members are scholars, experts, and representatives of private organizations.  
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necessity of the takings project. In the several cases so far, courts appear to spill more 
ink on necessity than on public interest. Nonetheless, in every case the court 
concludes that the government has passed the tests. Thus, the more stringent 
requirements by the legislature may not have nudged the administrative courts to 
adopt a stricter review standard of the takings projects by the administrative branch. 
  
III. SUBJECTS OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER 
Only the state can exercise the eminent domain power. The Ministry of the 
Interior has the power to approve or disapprove a takings project as the designated 
organ of the state (Article 14 of the LEA). The more important question under Taiwan 
law is who can apply as a “land use applicant” to the Ministry of the Interior for 
condemning real properties. In theory, private (legal) persons can be a land use 
applicant (Wen 2013:528), but in practice, no statute has authorized any private 
parties to become a land use applicant (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a:11). 
According to Article 15 of the Enforcement Rules for the LEA, central government 
agencies, city governments, county governments, town governments, and irrigation 
associations7 are land use applicants.  
                                                 
7 Irrigation associations are public legal persons in Taiwan law. 
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Private takings, however, are not an empty set. As Bell (2009) points out, private 
takings are often disguised. Article 787 of the Taiwan Civil Code, for instance, 
recognizes “statutory easement” (Chang 2013a). Statutory easement, often called 
legal servitude of passage in civil law jurisdictions such as Louisiana (Wilmore 1986; 
Sentell 1994; Yiannopoulos 1996; Merwe 1999; Huffstetler 2002), deals with the 
problem of accessing public roads for landlocked land. In general, a statutory 
easement is granted to landlocked owners to pass through neighboring land. The 
passage has to be necessary, and landlocked owners are required to compensate 
owners of neighboring parcels. In the U.S., the takings nature of statutory easement is 
clearer because administrative agencies are often involved in the process of 
establishing a statutory easement (Merrill and Smith 2010: 204; Bruce and Ely 2011: 
4:14). The U.S. Supreme Court, in Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 679–
80 (1979), has explicitly pointed out that easements of necessity (the doctrinal brother 
of statutory easement) and eminent domain are alternative ways to reach the same 
results for the state. Civil law, including Taiwan law, however, has rarely drawn 
analogy of private condemnation to statutory easement. Hence, this chapter will not 
foray further into statutory easement, but it is worth pointing out that statutes 
regarding administrative law are not the exclusive sources for stipulations of takings 
(in the functional sense). 




IV.  JUST COMPENSATION 
In Chang (2009, 2012, 2013b), I provide theoretical analysis and empirical 
examinations of takings compensation law in Taiwan in 1954–1977 and 1977–2012. 
One of the major changes in the 2012 revision of the LEA reformed the compensation 
law. Before the reform, land value was assessed by combining a pre-determined and 
under-assessed official land value with a pre-determined extra bonus. After the 
reform, market value of land should be used to compensate condemnees. While land 
value is a major component of the compensation package, it is not the only one. 
Section A describes all the elements of takings compensation. Section B then focuses 
on how market value of land has been appraised since 2012. Section C surveys the 
judicial review of takings compensation cases. 
 
A. The Elements of Takings Compensation 
Total takings compensation includes that for land; constructional improvements 
(such as a house); agricultural improvements (such as trees); incurred expenses for 
land improvements; business losses; and relocation expenses. Takings compensation 
“shall be paid within fifteen days after the expiration of the public announcement 
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period” (Article 20 of the LEA), and the public announcement period is 30 days after 
the city/county government, upon receiving the notice of approval from the Ministry 
of the Interior, makes a public announcement and notifies condemnees (Article 18 of 
the LEA). Except for land value compensation (which is discussed in Section B), I 
introduce the appraisal methods for these compensations in turn.8 
Compensation for constructional improvements equals “replacement cost at the 
time of expropriation” (Article 31 of the LEA). The Ministry of the Interior has 
stipulated a few regulations that detail the proper assessment method. The city/county 
governments (the first-level local governments in Taiwan) are responsible for 
calculating the replacement costs themselves or commissioning real estate appraisers 
to do the work (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a: 288). Only legal buildings are 
eligible for compensation.9 
 Compensation for agricultural improvements “shall be determined based on the 
value of the ripened crops thereof, provided the crops are due to ripen in less than one 
year from the date of expropriation, or based on the cost incurred in their planting and 
cultivation with reference to their current value, provided the crops are due to ripen in 
more than one year from the date of expropriation” (Article 31 of the LEA). The 
                                                 
8 I omit the discussion of compensation for contiguous land (not condemned but affected).  
9 For a study on illegal buildings in Taiwan, see Chang and Smith (2015). 
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Ministry of the Interior has enacted incredibly detailed tables for determining the 
compensable value of various types of trees and flowers. As the tables are public 
information and some plants are more valuable than others, condemnees have 
incentives to rush to grow certain highly-compensable plants before the date of 
expropriation. The Ministry of the Interior, in response, stipulates in its regulation that 
only “normal planting” is compensable.10 Many litigants in the administrative courts 
dispute whether their planting process is normal. Satellite photos of the land in 
question are often used to solve these cases (Chang 2012b).    
According to the relevant laws and regulations, landowners who have incurred 
expenses for improving land (such as constructing a conduit or a dam and paving a 
road) and stopped the improvement work can receive reimbursement for the expenses 
(Article 32 of the LEA). 
Article 33 of the LEA stipulates that “[i]f the expropriated land or land 
improvement was originally provided for legal business operations, the loss sustained 
due to the cessation of business or shrinkage of business scale as a result of land or 
land improvement expropriation shall be compensated.” Note that, again, only legal 
                                                 
10 This practice is authorized by Article 23 of the LEA: “….Nor shall the landowners or users …plant 
more agricultural improvements on the land [since the public announcement of expropriation]. In case 
any of the aforementioned works is ongoing when the public announcement is made, it shall be 
immediately stopped.” 
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businesses will be compensated. The Ministry of the Interior designed a formula to 
compute positive business losses (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a: 291). Firms that 
are losing money will of course not receive compensation.  
 Relocation expenses are a combination of different fees related to moving. In 
short, the following items are compensable: Moving fees for graves, memorials, and 
other constructions that owners prefer relocating; moving fees for residents whose 
household registration records show that they are in residence six months before the 
takings notice is posted; moving fees for large machinery, livestock, etc. There are 
assessment standards for each category (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a: 292–93).     
 
B. Appraisal of Land Value 
Assessment of land value is the most complicated and controversial part of 
determining the amount of takings compensation, as appraisal of land value now is 
not formulaic and land value takes up a lion’s share of the total takings compensation. 
Before 2012, determining the compensable land value was mechanical. Chang (2009; 
2013b) has shown that a majority of condemnees were under-compensated under the 
old regime, which relied on official land value for tax purposes in the critical 
calculation. This section introduces and evaluates the new regime. My reform 
proposal will appear in Part VIII. 
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Condemnees shall receive “current market value” as compensation for 
expropriation of their land (Article 30 of the LEA). The Land Value Evaluation 
Committee in each city/county government determines the current market value.11 
The Committee is not itself an agency; rather, it makes decisions in the name of the 
local city/county government. The compensation is paid from the budget of the land 
use applicant. Below is a summary of how current market value is assessed and 
adjusted. 
The current market value is appraised by either local governments themselves or 
real estate appraisers commissioned by local governments. Both have to follow the 
Regulations on Appraising Current Market Value for Takings Compensation Purposes 
in assessing the value of condemned land.12 In short, the Regulation prescribes that 
the comparable sale approach (also known as the market data approach) is the 
principle, and the income capitalization approach is the exception.  
 More specifically, in principle, appraising current market value for takings 
                                                 
11 This committee has 17–19 members, and comprises the (deputy) mayor, a local legislator, five local 
government officials, and several representatives from relevant associations. 
12 Scholars have heavily criticized this stipulation, contending that (1) Regulations on Appraising 
Current Market Value for Takings Compensation Purposes is not as sophisticated and accurate as 
Regulations on Real Estate Appraisals; (2) real estate appraisers have to follow Regulations on Real 
Estate Appraisals in their other works. Why is an idiosyncratic approach necessary for assessing 
compensable land value? (Kang 2014: 21–22; Lin 2012: 84; Chen 2012: 102). 
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compensation purposes can be broken down into several steps (Articles 4–21 of the 
Regulations on Appraising Current Market Value for Takings Compensation 
Purposes):  
1) collecting or revising all kinds of maps (such as urban planning and zoning maps); 
2) collecting information on real estate sales between March 2 and September 1 of the 
“baseline year” (Y1);  
3) demarcating the jurisdictions into “land value zones” by land value, zoning, 
infrastructure, among others;  
4) estimating the “normal”13 adjusted-to-September-1st unit price (Taiwan Dollars per 
square meter) of the collected sales;  
5) among the collected sales, choosing 3 comparable land parcels within the land 
value zones where the takings project in question takes place;  
6) comparing with the comparable land parcels and estimating the unit price of the 
condemned land;  
7) submitting the estimations to Land Value Evaluation Committee for approval or 
                                                 
13 The Regulations on Appraising Current Market Value for Takings Compensation Purposes specifies 
rules for appraisers to adjust the abnormality of the sale prices. 
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adjustment. The approved unit land will then be used for condemnations taking place 
in the next, “current year” (Y2=Y1+1).14 
 Market value of land fluctuates on a daily basis, so an up-to-date land value has 
to be estimated for land expropriations that take place after July 1 of the current year. 
An adjustment ratio should be computed based on the relative estimated price on 
September 1 of the baseline year and March 1 of the current year.15 Since August 
2012, the actual sale prices of all real estate transactions have to be reported to the 
government (Chang 2015). Thus, the government now has a firm grasp of the market 
value of land. Since 2014 (the Ministry of the Interior 2013b: 14), the actual sale price 
data were used to compute the adjustment ratio. More specifically, local governments 
compare the average sale prices of comparable properties whose unit prices are 
between the 25 percentile and the 75 percentile in both the baseline period (March 2 
to September 1 of the baseline year) and the current period (September 2 of the 
baseline year to March 1 of the current year) to estimate the percentage changes in 
land value (the Ministry of the Interior 2013b: 14–16; Articles 26 and 29 of the 
Regulations on Appraising Current Market Value for Takings Compensation 
                                                 
14 There are exceptions, but I omit the details here. 
15 March 1 of the current year is six months after September 1 of the baseline year. September 1, as 
described in the text, is the baseline date for adjusting sale prices of comparable land. Article 30 of the 
LEA prescribes that local governments have to investigate market conditions every six months. 
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Purposes).16 Finally, the estimations of adjustment ratios should be sent to Land 
Value Evaluation Committee for approval or adjustment.  
In principle, condemnees receive the up-to-date current market value as 
compensation. Takings projects finalized between January 1 and June 30 of the 
current year should use the current market value estimated on the basis of market 
value on September 1 of the baseline year. Those closed in the second half of the 
current year should use the aforementioned market value adjusted by the adjustment 
ratio, to update the current market value to March 1 of the current year. An exception: 
if the current market value of the baseline year has been publicly announced and 
notified to the condemnees, and the adjusted current market value of the current year 
is lower than the former value, the higher market value of the baseline year shall still 
be used to compensate the condemnees (Article 30 of the Enforcement Rules for the 
LEA).  
 
C. Judicial Review 
Administrative courts defer to the local governments’ assessment of current 
                                                 
16 That is, the 25% highest and 25% lowest unit prices are excluded. The average prices of the rest of 
the unit prices in both periods are calculated separately and then compared.  
Adjustment ratio=average price in the current period / average price in the baseline period. 
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market value. In the pre-2012 regime, takings compensation was determined by the 
pre-announced official land value. Administrative courts’ hesitation in giving the 
official values a hard look is understandable, but not justified. In the post-2012 
regime, however, the legislature prescribes compensation of current market value. As 
current market value is an objective, verifiable fact that anyone with the right training 
can estimate, administrative courts should substantively review the estimates of 
current market value by the governments, rather than deferring to them. So far (until 
October 10, 2014), I have found 6 administrative court cases which apply the new 
Article 30 of the LEA. In all six cases, however, the courts defer to the local 
governments. In Chang (2013c), I found that administrative courts in Taiwan before 
2012 only conducted a “procedural review” of takings compensation determination, 
rather than a “substantive review.” That is, administrative courts only examined 
whether all the procedures stipulated in the regulations and statutes were followed. If 
they were, administrative courts assumed that the estimates were correct, or at least 
worthy of their deference. It appears that this mindset has not changed.  
 
V. OVERALL DUE PROCESS 
The due process for takings and its preceding procedures stipulated by the LEA 
is shown in a flow chart, Figure 1. Stages 1–5 are the preceding procedures, and 
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stages 6–15 are the takings procedures. Due to limited space, I will only focus on the 
negotiated purchase procedure (stage 5), a mandatory process before a land use 
applicant can apply for expropriation.  
In principle, land use applicants have to negotiate in good faith and in their best 
efforts with the owners of the land needed for the undertakings, before applying to the 
Ministry of the Interior for expropriation (Article 11 of the LEA). Land use applicants 
should bargain with the owners based on “market value” (Article 11 of the LEA). In 
both the negotiated purchase here and the takings setting, the legislature uses market 
value as the standard for compensation. Nonetheless, Article 30 of the LEA stipulates 
that the market value in the takings procedure has to be approved by the Land Value 
Evaluation Committee, while Article 11 of the LEA defines market value as “mean 
normal transaction price in the market” without designating any agency or committee 
to approve the estimated market value. The Ministry of the Interior has advised land 
use applicants that the market value used in the negotiated purchase procedure need 
not equate the market value approved by the Land Value Evaluation Committee; in 
fact, a hard, non-negotiable bottom-line is the antithesis of the spirit of negotiated 
purchase (the Ministry of the Interior 2013a: 50–51, 1071–73).  
The current practice of negotiated purchase is still in flux. Taoyuan County still 
relied on the pre-2012 regime, using Publicly Announced Land Value (an official land 
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value for property tax purposes) plus a 40 percent bonus, claiming that this would 
give condemnees more than the government-assessed market value—which, I should 
note, probably is below the real market value. By contrast, the New Taipei City 
commissioned independent real estate appraisers to assess the market value to be 
offered to condemnees. I cannot find any data on how often land use applicants 
“successfully” persuade the landowners to sell the land in question to them. My 
conjecture is that if the offered price in the negotiation is not much different from the 
current market value to be used in the takings stage (as it is often alleged to be the 
case), landowners would not have incentives to sell their properties to the land use 
applicants, as they receive tax benefits and condemnee status in takings procedures, 
among other reasons. Finally, I have found a Supreme Administrative Court case 
rendered in 201 that took a hard look at the negotiated purchase procedure, revoking 
and remanding the case to the lower court to review again whether the land use 
applicant had made a good-faith negotiated purchase. 
 
VI. DISTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENT SURPLUSES 
In Taiwan, landowners are excluded from appropriating any part of the 
development surplus. Sharing surpluses implies that condemnees will receive more 
than the market value of their properties as compensation. For Taiwanese condemnees 
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in the past few decades who did not receive even market-value compensation, getting 
a dip of the surplus is unrealistic. The Constitutional Court of Taiwan, in 
Interpretation No. 579, has ruled that the takings compensation must be 
commensurate with the losses of the condemnees.17 Losses refer to the property value 
taken away from the condemnees, not the lost opportunities to gain from the takings 
project. Hence, for ordinary takings, all development surpluses go to the state. 
 The compensation mechanism for zone expropriation, however, might enable 
condemnees to share some of the development surpluses. In zone expropriation 
procedures, condemnees have the option to choose between compensation in cash (as 
in land expropriation procedure) and compensation in kind—namely, condemnees can 
request to receive post-development land in lieu of cash compensation (Articles 39–
40 of the LEA). The size of the post-development land parcel shall, in principle, be no 
larger than 50%, but be larger than 40% of the area of the condemned land parcel, 
unless “otherwise approved by the superior competent authority under special 
circumstances” (Article 39). In general, the floor-area ratios of the post-development 
land increase, market unit value often more than doubles, and condemnees who 
choose the in-kind option also receive tax benefits (Chen 2013: 272). As a result, the 
                                                 
17 English translation of this Interpretation is available at the official website of the Constitutional 
Court http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=579. 
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market value of the smaller post-development plot received by the condemnees as in-
kind compensation is higher than the cash compensation the condemnees would have 
received. As the cash compensation is assessed based on pre-development land value, 
condemnees in zone expropriation who opts for in-kind compensation receive some of 
the development surplus. The government, however, still keeps most of the 
development surplus.  
 
VII. THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
The dispute resolution system regarding takings contains several levels of 
scrutiny. Any person with an interest in the expropriated land or land improvement 
(often, but not limited to, condemnees of land ownership) can object to the contents of 
the public announcements of takings within the announcement period. The amount of 
compensation is included in the announcement, but other matters (such as the scope of 
the expropriation) are contained, too. The local governments shall investigate the 
matter and notify the interested person in writing of the findings and actions taken. If 
those interested are still discontent, and they have contested the amount of the 
compensation, the local government has the discretion to refer the matter to the Land 
Value Evaluation Committee for re-consideration. If those interested still disagree 
with the result of reconsideration, they can initiate “administrative appeal.” Provided 
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that the interested people challenged matters other than compensation, the re-
consideration stage would be skipped.  
“Review committees” in the administrative appeal are expected to conduct 
“merits review”; that is, modifying improper yet legal administrative decisions. In 
other words, they should consider every aspect of an administrative act, examine 
whether it fits the government policies, and explore whether a different decision 
would better realize the legislative intent. When an agency uses its discretion and 
makes a bad judgment (but not to the extent of abuse of discretion), or an agency 
interprets a statute in an allowable (but not ideal) way, the administrative court cannot 
vacate it. Instead, the law requires the review committees to redress the harms by 
revoking the original administrative act and directing the administrative agencies to 
come up with a better decision. Therefore, although administrative agencies have 
discretion in interpreting statutes, review committees’ discretion trumps the agencies’, 
and the law does not expect review committees to defer to administrative agencies’ 
discretion in fact-finding or statutory interpretation. Review committees, however, do 
not appear to be very active. The revocation rate in all the administrative appeal 
procedures in the central government level was 10% between 2005 and 2009 (Chang 
2014). In a prior empirical study, I found that takings compensation cases took up 
about 14% of all administrative appeal cases handled by Review Committee of the 
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Ministry of the Interior in 2006–2009, and the revocation rate of these takings 
compensation cases was 10.3%; more importantly, review committees rarely 
conducted merits reviews, limiting themselves to merely legality reviews (Chang 
2012b). My comprehensive survey of all administrative reviews rendered in the first 
nine months of 2014 revealed that, in applying the new law, the Review Committee of 
the Ministry of the Interior has taken a more active role in certain cases, revoking the 
assessment of takings compensation by the administrative agency; nevertheless, 
deference to such decisions still appears to be the norm.  
The last stop in the dispute resolution mechanism is the administrative court—
unless the condemnees lose and bring their cases to the Constitutional Court, and the 
cases are taken. As the condemned land or fixtures are most likely worth more than 
13,000 US dollars, the court of the first instance is the High Administrative Court 
(Articles 104-1 & 229 of the Administrative Litigation Act). In principle, the 
condemnees can appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court if the high court 
decisions are in contravention of the law (Articles 238, 242–243 of the Administrative 
Litigation Act). The administrative courts in Taiwan generally are not big believers in 
judicial activism. Chen (2013: 165), however, has identified several administrative 
court cases that chastised the administrative agencies that treat negotiated purchases 
as a mere formality, instead of bargaining in good faith. That said, as noted above, 
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administrative courts are highly deferential to the administrative agencies in terms of 
assessment of takings compensation.  
 
VIII. EVALUATING THE TAKINGS REGIME IN TAIWAN 
The 2012 reform of the LEA marks the third major change of takings 
compensation since 1949 (Chang 2013b). Generally speaking, this latest reform may 
be optimal in terms of law in books. Of course, it is the law in action that matters for 
the condemnees and the general public. As the new LEA is still young, it is unclear 
whether the amended regime can guarantee condemnees with the basic respect they 
deserve in a democracy. This chapter has offered evidence for worries, as the 
administrative agencies have not shown significant changes in their course of business 
and the administrative courts appear to be deferential as usual. Given an inactive 
court, one should not rely too heavily on the administrative court to raise the standard 
of review of the public interest in takings cases. If land value appraisals are still 
considered highly technical matters that only the governments or the real estate 
appraisers they hire can understand, administrative courts will still pass on reviewing 
these critical decisions. This part advances a new approach, under which estimation of 
market value of condemned land through hedonic regression models with block-level 
sale data is mandatory. By making the estimation more transparent, I hope that courts 
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will become more willing to review the decision. Provided that condemnees can really 
receive market value as compensation, it leaves much less room for governments to 
condemn unnecessary land. This is the law of demand.   
 Real estate appraisers in Taiwan, like their colleagues elsewhere, still largely rely 
on the conventional method to estimate market value. Appraisals are handiwork, 
based on experience, and their subjectivity makes them unlikely to be contested.  
 The era of big data has come to Taiwan, and hedonic regression models that 
utilize big data to assess market value of land have become too powerful to ignore. 
Actual market sale prices of real estates had been kept secret for decades. None other 
than the transacting parties themselves (and perhaps their agents) knew the actual 
prices. Transaction taxes were levied based on official land value, not actual sale 
prices. As a result, no one had large enough data to utilize regression models. 
Things changed, however, in 2012. As part of his presidential re-election 
campaign, President MA Ying-jeou advocated “residential justice.” The legislature 
passed or revised five statutes, three of which mandate that the actual sale prices of 
immovable properties be reported to the government. The “actual price report” regime 
came into effect on August 1, 2012. The raw data are available for download, and the 
competent agency, the Ministry of the Interior, started a website that enables users to 
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check sale prices in any region in Taiwan through a graphic interface.18 Users can 
also acquire information on that website regarding the transacting month, total area, 
zoning, layout of the apartment (such as how many rooms), etc. (Chang 2015).  
New and larger data sets are churned out every day. From August 2012 to 
February 2013 alone, there were 188,900 reported sales of land and/or building. The 
data regarding the sales of land are summarized in Table 3. From August 2012 to 
November 2014, the reported number of sales of land and/or building increased to 
840,165. 
With these (ever-increasing) sets of data and a properly specified hedonic 
regression model, market value of any land parcel in Taiwan since August 2012 can be 
estimated with pretty high accuracy. My co-authors and I have developed a hedonic 
regression model elsewhere (Chang, Chen, and Lin 2014). The model, introduced in 
details below, is an ordinary least square (OLS) model with robust standard errors. The 
dependent variable is the actual sale price. The independent variables control for the 
land size, zoning, transaction month, and the number of plots involved. The models 
take the following form:  
iiiiiii vSMZNAP ++++++= γηδθβα                  
                                                 
18 http://lvr.land.moi.gov.tw/N11/homePage.action#. 
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where P is natural log of sale prices; A is natural log of land area; N is natural log of 
the number of land plots involved; Z are 9 zoning dummies that capture 10 types of 
zonings: non-urban (agricultural—not prime), non-urban (agricultural—prime), non-
urban (industrial), non-urban (preserved), non-urban (residential), urban (industrial), 
urban (residential), urban (business), urban (agricultural), and urban (other); M are 
dummy variables indicating the month of the transaction. S are a series of dummies 
indicating the strata of the town/city in which the land in question is located. Strata 1 
to 7 represent central business districts, industrial and business districts, growing 
towns, towns with traditional industries, lowly developed towns, aging towns, and 
least developed towns, respectively.19 v is the error term. The coefficients to be 
estimated are α, β, δ, θ, η, γ. The regression result is shown in Table 4. A high R-
square of 0.73 means that this simple model can capture 73% of the deviations of the 
actual market prices from the average market prices. I am positive that most social 
scientists who do quantitative work will agree that an R-square of 0.73 is very 
satisfactory. With more data and more information to improve the model, using 
hedonic regression models to estimate market value will become more and more 
accurate in Taiwan.  
                                                 19 The stratum classification is based on Hou et al. (2008).  
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 I am not proposing the banishment of real estate appraisers from the takings 
procedure. Not at all. There is a confidence interval in any statistical estimates, and 
hedonic regression models are vulnerable to idiosyncrasy of land characteristics. 
Instead of entirely relying on statistical methods or subjective appraisals, why not get 
the best of both worlds? The governments can (and, I think, should) use the estimates 
(with, say, a 95% or 90% confidence interval) by the hedonic regression model as the 
benchmark, and require real estate appraisers to adjust the benchmark, if necessary. 
The appraisal reports should detail the reasons for the adjustments. Both the 
regression estimates and the appraisal reports should be provided to the landowners 
no later than the negotiated purchase stage. The informed landowners can then decide 
to accept the offer or challenge the amount of takings compensation later. Market 
value appraisal is objective, and local governments and real estate appraisers should 
thus be held more accountable than before by administrative courts. In other words, 
administrative courts should no longer defer on appraisal matters. Rather, experts 
hired by the condemnees should be allowed to debate the merits of the land value 
assessed by local governments. Administrative courts should commission independent 
appraisers to evaluate the quality of the appraisal reports by both sides. In the long 
run, only a more active court can  bring equity to the condemnees.  
 




A pessimistic story emerges from my survey of the six pillars of eminent domain 
law in Taiwan. In four pillars—public interest criteria, just compensation, due process, 
and the dispute resolution system—the 2012 legislative reform improved the takings 
law in the book. Nevertheless, the new law did not appear to bring along new 
practices, at least not yet. The administrative agencies and the administrative courts, 
as current evidence suggests, followed the letter but not the spirit of the new 
legislature mandate. The subjects of the eminent domain power remain unchanged, as 
also their attitude toward wielding the eminent domain power. The new law promises 
market value compensation for landowners, who still have no share of the 
development surpluses.  
The lesson for other jurisdictions is that a quantitative method should be used in 
the eminent domain procedure. In my prior work and this chapter, I have 
demonstrated the power of hedonic regression models in accurately estimating land 
value. Also, I have shown that various assessment methods, based on owners’ self-
assessment or on real estate appraisers’ assessments for condemnors, have failed to 
reach the goal of giving condemnees market value compensation. It is not that human 
being’s evaluation is always inaccurate (though it is sometimes). Rather, the problem 
has often been that the evaluation is biased by various other concerns, such as paying 
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less taxes or gaining more business. Statistical methods have a cold appearance. 
Human right advocates hardly characterize statistics as protectors of property or other 
human rights. The counter-intuitive lesson from the takings law is that cold method 
can yield warm results.  
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2001  1340.9  15.0  843.4  4.2  267.7  14.4  13.8  1.3  22.7  0.2  158.2  
2002  1075.2  41.2  455.7  43.7  292.6  1.9  9.7  12.8  10.5  0.6  206.5  
2003  967.0  64.6  554.1  7.9  185.6  41.0  3.5  43.2  11.8  0.1  55.1  
2004  970.7  62.2  379.4  4.0  194.2  11.0  5.8  0.4  20.3  0.0  293.3  
2005  1085.6  17.5  503.0  20.5  178.5  9.5  10.2  8.8  2.7  0.0  334.7  
2006  704.8  100.5  193.7  18.2  133.6  0.3  2.3  0.5  4.6  0.0  251.0  
2007  672.1  6.1  286.8  0.7  211.4  9.0  1.0  0.8  3.5  —        152.8  
2008  572.9  3.9  188.6  27.6  221.4  17.2  4.7  2.7  7.7  0.2  98.8  
2009  1658.4  0.6  438.6  16.9  259.8  3.6  1.0  0.5  4.6  0.1  932.6  
2010  1169.7  30.6  219.6  3.5  840.6  6.6  1.1  0.8  2.5  0.0  64.5  
2011  669.4  0.0  135.0  0.1  488.9  0.0  0.4  1.5  1.6  0.0  41.9  
2012  320.2  12.6  73.0  0.2  232.3  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.1  0.0  1.2  
2013  565.6  13.2  112.2  48.1  111.5  3.2  7.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  269.7  
Total 11772.4 368.2  4383.2  195.6  3618.1  117.9  61.2  74.3  92.7  1.2  2860.0  
Unit: Hectare. Source: the Ministry of the Interior, available at http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/year/y05-08.xls.  
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Expropriated Area Usage of Land 






Agricultural Zone  
2001 40  2686.4  713.4  1973.0  1413.5  1272.8  0.0  
2002 42  2895.8  722.1  2173.7  1521.6  1374.2  0.0  
2003 50  3414.1  813.4  2600.7  1852.2  1561.8  0.0  
2004 59  4584.7  873.1  3711.6  2621.7  1962.9  0.0  
2005 64  5320.0  911.6  4408.4  2982.0  2337.9  0.0  
2006 75  6652.8  1159.2  5493.5  3644.1  3008.7  0.0  
2007 77  6711.4  1163.0  5548.4  3678.9  3032.5  0.0  
2008 79  7020.5  1284.3  5736.3  3782.4  3238.2  0.0  
2009 84  7137.2  1307.1  5830.1  3839.2  3298.1  0.0  
2010 91  7448.8  1344.7  6104.0  4004.0  3444.8  0.0  
2011 93  7650.2  1375.0  6275.1  4111.6  3538.5  0.0  
2012 95  7672.2  1377.5  6294.7  4122.3  3549.9  0.0  
2013 100  8002.2  1409.3  6592.9  4310.8  3691.3  0.1  
Total 949  77196.1  14453.7  62742.4  41884.3  35311.7  0.1  
Unit: Hectare. Source: the Ministry of the Interior, available at http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/year/y05-15.xls. 
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Table 3 Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Hedonic Regression Models 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
Variables N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Sale Price 60,530 110,258,700 2,900,000 524,863,400 54 5,682,620,000 
Land Area 60,530 1,471 358 4,598 0.01 411,300 
Number of plot 60,530 1.9 1 2.8 1 88 
Panel B: categorical variables (N=60,530.) 
Source: Chang, Chen, and Lin (2014). 
Variable types and names % 
Zoning  9.6  
non-urban (agricultural—not prime) 12.5  
non-urban (preserved) 0.8  
non-urban (industrial) 19.5  
non-urban (agricultural—prime) 4.4  
non-urban (residential) 1.7  
urban (industrial) 21.0  
urban (residential) 2.2  
urban (business) 9.5  
urban (agricultural) 9.6  
Strata  100 
   1 7.3  
   2 15.3  
3 32.1  
4 17.8  
5 19.5  
6 6.5  
7 1.6  
Months 100 
Before 2012/8 8.6  
2012/8 15.5  
2012/9 15.1  
2012/10 14.4  
2012/11 15.0  
2012/12 17.9  
2013/1 11.5  
2013/2 2.0  
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Table 4 Regression results for estimating market price and market rent 
 
Dependent variable: ln of total sale price 
=1 if stratum 1 2.746*** 
 (0.025) 
=1 if stratum 2 2.024*** 
 (0.021) 
=1 if stratum 3 1.549*** 
 (0.018) 
=1 if stratum 4 1.394*** 
 (0.018) 
=1 if stratum 5 0.424*** 
 (0.018) 
Ln of land area 0.857*** 
 (0.003) 
Ln of number of plot 0.053*** 
 (0.007) 
Zoning dummies Yes 





Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Source: Chang, Chen, and Lin (2014). 
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Source: The Ministry of the Interior (2013a: 24). Note: dotted arrows and boxes are procedures not 
always required. 
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